Arambula v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38698 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-16-2012
Arambula v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38698
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Arambula v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38698" (2012). Not Reported. 275.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/275
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID HO 
ARMANDO KETO ARAMBULA 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
OPY 
NO. 38698 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
RESPONDENT 
ARMANDO KETO ARAMBULA 
#56927 
125 North 8th Street West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
6 
PROSE 
PETITION ER-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of -rhe Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................... 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
Arambula Has Waived His Claims On Appeal By Failing 
To Support The Claims With Argument And Authority; Even 
If Not Waived, Arambula Has Failed To Show Error In The 
Summary Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction Petition ............................. 5 
A. lntroduction ................................................................................. 5 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5 
C. The Court Should Decline To Consider Arambula's 
Claims Because They Are Unsupported By Argument 
And Authority .............................................................................. 5 
D. Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Arambula's 
Claims, He Has Failed To Establish The District Court 
Erred In Summarily Dismissing His Petition ............................... 6 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 8 
APPENDICES A - C 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001) ....................................................... 6 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 57 P.3d 787 (2002) ................................................ 5 
Prattv. State, 134 Idaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000) ............................................................ 6 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ...................................................... 6 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P .2d 966 (1996) ..................................................... 5 
Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P .2d 1216 (1990) .................................................... 6 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P .3d 798 (2007) ............................................. 5, 6 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-852 ................................................................................................................ 2, 4 
l.C. § 19-4906 .................................................................................................................. 6 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Armando Keto Arambula appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Narcotics Detective Ken Rivers of the Twin Falls Police department assisted 
Probation and Parole Officer Leslie Horner in conducting a probationary check of 
Arambula's house, which resulted in the seizure of a digital scale with 
methamphetamine residue on it, and paperwork that appeared to be a ledger used to 
record drug transactions. (R., pp.77, 168-171.) Arambula admitted to the detective that 
he owned the digital scale. (R., p.172.) The state charged Arambula with possession of 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine or amphetamine) and with being a persistent 
violator based on having two prior convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. 
(R., pp.71-74.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Arambula pied guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and the state agreed to dismiss the persistent violator 
enhancement. (R., pp.83-92; 100-104.) The district court imposed a unified seven year 
sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.105-111.) 
Arambula filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging (1) "Idaho's 
possession of a controlled substance statute is unconstitutionally vague," (2) "[c]ounsel 
of record, Ben Anderson, was inneffective [sic] for failing to file a motion in liminie [sic] in 
an attempt to suppress the narcotics test," (3) "[c]ounsel was inneffective [sic] for failure 
to adequately cross examine the states [sic] witness," (4) "[c]ounsel was inneffective 
[sic] for failing to provide the necessary services due to an indigent prisoner pursuant to 
1 
I.C. § 19-852," (5) "[c]ounsel was inneffective [sic] for failure to address the vaguely 
written chain of custody," and (6) "[t]he district court erred in refusing to provide the 
petitioner with alternate counsel upon multiple requests to the court." (R., pp. 7-13 
(capitalization modified where appropriate).) Arambula also filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel, which the court granted. (R., pp.45-51.) After the state filed an 
answer (R., pp.62-65) and a motion for summary disposition (R., pp.134-136), the court 
entered an order indicating its intent to dismiss Arambula's petition (R., pp.138-145). 
Arambula filed a response to the state's motion for summary disposition and the court's 
notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.147-157.) 
The district court held a hearing on the state's motion for summary disposition 
and its own notice of intent to dismiss, and after the parties presented argument, the 
court verbally ruled that Arambula's petition had no merit and dismissed it with 
prejudice. (Tr., p.4, L.4 - p.27, L.24.) In a follow-up written order dismissing 
Arambula's petition with prejudice, the court incorporated its verbal ruling and notice of 
intent to dismiss into the order as its stated grounds for dismissal. (R., pp.181-182.) 
Arambula timely appealed. (R., pp.183-185.) Although the district court appointed 
counsel to represent Arambula on appeal (R., pp.186-188), this Court permitted 
appellate counsel to withdraw after he and two other attorneys with the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office reviewed the case and "each of the three attorneys determined 
that the appeal failed to present any viable issues for review." (Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed October 5, 2011; Affidavit in 
Support of Motion for Leave to Withdraw and Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
filed October 5, 2011; Order Granting Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend the 
2 
Briefing Schedule, dated November 7, 2011.) Arambula thereafter filed a pro se 
Appellant's Brief. 
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ISSUE 
Contrary to I.AR. 35(a)(4), Arambula's brief does not contain a list of issues on 
appeal. However, throughout his brief, he presents six issues with the following 
headings: 
1. "Idaho's possession of a controlled substance statute is 
unconstitutionally vague," 
2. "Counsel of record, Ben Anderson, was inneffective [sic] for failing 
to file a motion in liminie [sic] in an attempt to suppress the narcotics test," 
3. "Counsel was inneffective [sic] for failure to adequately cross 
examine the states [sic] witness," 
4 "Counsel was inneffective [sic] for failing to provide the necessary 
services due to an indigent prisoner pursuant to I.C. § 19-852," 
5. "Counsel was inneffective [sic] for failure to address the vaguely 
written chain of custody," and 
6. "The district court erred in refusing to provide the petitioner with 
alternate counsel upon multiple requests to the court." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-10 (capitalization modified where appropriate).) 
The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Should the Court decline to consider any of Arambula's claims on appeal as he 
has failed to support his claims with argument and authority? Alternatively, has 
Arambula failed to establish error in the summary dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Arambula Has Waived His Claims On Appeal By Failing To Support The Claims With 
Argument And Authority; Even If Not Waived, Arambula Has Failed To Show Error In 
The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction Petition 
A Introduction 
Arambula's brief on appeal is not actually a brief. Rather, Arambula has merely 
photocopied his post-conviction petition's six claims with exhibits, and added the word 
"brief' in the footers, which he asks this Court to "screen as [his] Appellants [sic] Brief." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.2; see generally entire Appellant's Brief; cf. R., pp.7-13.) This Court 
should decline to consider Arambula's claims because he has failed to support them 
with argument and authority. Alternatively, Arambula has failed to establish the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits 
on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. The Court Should Decline To Consider Arambula's Claims Because They Are 
Unsupported By Argument And Authority 
"When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 
966, 970 (1996). Although Arambula replicates the six claims he set forth in his post-
conviction petition, he has failed to cite any authority in support of his claims and has 
5 
offered absolutely no argument in support of his claims. (See generally Appellant's 
Brief.) Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider the merits of any of his claims. 
D. Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Arambula's Claims, He Has Failed 
To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. 'To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each 
element of petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. 
§ 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must 
accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, 
or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P .3d at 802 
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). If the alleged 
facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition. kL (citing Stuart v. 
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved 
6 
by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." 
Id. 
In both its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post Conviction Petition Claims (R., pp.138-
145) and its verbal ruling at the end of the hearing on the state's motion for summary 
disposition and its own notice of intent to dismiss, the district court articulates the 
applicable legal standards and sets forth, in detail, the reasons Arambula failed to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims. The state adopts (1) the 
district court's verbal ruling from the hearing on the state's motion for summary 
disposition and its notice of intent to dismiss (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.28, L.18), (2) the court's 
Judgment of Dismissal (R., pp.181-182), and (3) the court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Post Conviction Petition Claims (R., pp.138-145), copies of which are attached hereto 
as Appendices A, B, and C, respectively. Arambula does not challenge any of the 
courts findings or legal conclusions (see generally Appellant's Brief), and he has 
otherwise failed to establish the district court erred in dismissing his petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Ararnbula's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of April, 2012, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ARMANDO KETO ARAMBULA 
#56927 
125 North 8th Street West 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
JMC/pm 
. McKinney 
ty Attorney Genera 
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APPENDIX A 
1 
2 
3' 
4 
5 
chain of custody. 
In essence, what we have here is Mr. Arambula 
signing some documents that include the offer form; as 
well as the plea of guilty form; and he has indicated on 
the record that he wanted to change his plea, and that he 
6 waived his right to appeal, and gave up his right to 
7 
8 
9 
various claims in this case. 
10 
11 
, - 12 
13 
14 
r .... 15 
By choosing to plead guilty, the defendant has 
waived all of the claims that he has made in this 
post-conviction relief. He has also gained an advantage 
by entering his plea of guilty, which is that the state 
agreed to dismiss part two, which was the persistent 
violator enhancement in this case. 
That is something that we believe is crucial. 
Mr. Arambula took advantage of the offer, pied guilty. 
I i 16 The state was then bound by the offer at the time of 
sentencing. And now he wants to basically undo everything 
that was clearly done on the record. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
, 23 
24 
25 
Based upon the information in the state's 
summary disposition brief, as well as our argument today, 
we would ask that the petition be dismissed in its 
entirety. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Williams. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I have communicated with Mr. Arambula in this 
16 
1 officer. 
2 I have difficulty with whether that's a factual 
3 argument, because part of it's a legal argument, too, due 
4 to the doctrine of the waiver of defects at a preliminary 
5 hearing if you go to trial or enter a guilty plea. And 
6 
7 
8 
that encompasses, of course, the motion for suppression --
or the lack thereof that's claimed. 
And that there was no appeal that was filed. 
i 9 
i Actually, that's not at Issue, because that's - the state concedes to that 10 
-11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
THE-CllURT: Okay, thank you. 
Ms. Sweesy, any further argument? 
MS. SWEESY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I am prepared to rule on this 
motion at this time. I've studied this file In great 
depth, and I make these. findings for the record: 
First, the relief sought by the petitioner in 
this case is to grant him a new trial. I recognize that 
19 this was a oro se filing and that often petitioners don't 
20 articulate exactly what they're asking for, but the first 
21 Issue, I guess, is whether there could be any relief for 
22 granting a new trial in this case. Clearly not. There 
23 was never a trial to begin with. 
24 I think what Mr. Arambula is suggesting is that 
25 he should be allowed to withdraw his plea and start this 
18 
1 matter, trying to obtain responses to many of the 
2 questions that I had in going through the state's brief on 
3 each of the issues presented therein in order to overcome 
4 what is a clear record that was made previously. 
5 That resulted in the affidavit and the brief 
6 wnich, I grant, is mostly a legal brief. We're requesting 
7 the court Just apply facts in the record to the law that 
8 . was supplied. I know that there are a couple of issues 
9 thatare - I think one in the court's notice of intent to 
10 dismiss and a couple in the state's motion for summary 
11 Judgment that were not addressed in my brief, very simply, 
12 because of the record that was made below. 
13 However, most of the issues have been addressed 
14 in that brief, and I would simply submit that for the 
15 court's ruling. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Williams, do you see any factual 
17 disputes in this case that would warrant an evidentia:y 
18 hearing? 
19 MR. WILLIAMS: He has a dispute with the testing of 
20 the - the original testing which occurred with the 
21 officer that was questioned at the preliminary hearing 
22 stage, whether that first test was -- well, the first and 
23 second test were appropriate tests. Those were with a NIK 
24 test. But later on, of course, there was a forensics 
25 which supported the second test which was taken by the 
17 
1 case over. So giving great liberality to his pleadings, 
2 I'll take that as the position that he advocates here. 
3 I don't find that there are any factual disputes 
4 in this case that would warrant an evidentiary hearing. I 
5 think the record is very clear as to what occurred. 
6 He was arrested by law enforcement officers. At 
7 the time of that arrest, they found a digital scale. 
8 Detective Rivers, who was a trained narcotics officer, 
9 conducted a NIK field test on that scale. And as I read 
10 the preliminary hearing transcript, he did that in 
---· 11 less-than-acceptable lighting conditions. 
12 I interpret that to mean that he swabbed the 
13 scale; and the first swab, when tested, turned out to be a 
14 negative test. Later, when he took that scale back to the 
15 police station, he swabbed it again. I interpret his 
16 testimony from the preliminary hearing to mean that he 
17 swabbed it in a different location, and at that time 
18 obtained a positive NIK test result. 
19 Ultimately, the scale was sent to the state 
20 laboratory, and the chemist who tested it found the 
21 presence of methamphetamine on that scale. 
22 The lab report is attached to the 
23 petitioner's -- to the petitioner's petition, and there's 
24 no dispute that there was In fact a positive, scientific 
25 test for methamphetamine which went well beyond the NIK 
19 
1 test which the officer used. 
2 There's also undisputed that the chain of 
3 custody, which is actually Exhibit F of document D-81, 
4 which I believe is either the defense counsel's marking or 
·{> the state's marking In discovery, shows a chain of custody 
6 for this particular scale. 
7 This court has the authority to draw reasonable 
8 inferences from this record based upon the fact that I am 
9 the trier of fact, there's no jury involved in this case. 
10 I have seen dozens, if not hundreds, if not thousands of 
11 custody - chain-of-custody documents, particularly from 
12 the Twin Falls Police Department; and I've heard testimony 
13 in numerous cases concerning procedures Involved in 
14 transporting documents to and from the state lab; and it 
15 appears to me, and I make a finding that the 
16 chain-of-custody document is accurate in this case. 
17 It certainly reflects that the scale that was 
1 B seized by Detective Rivers is In fact the same one that 
19 was tested. 
20 Ultimately, the state charged Mr. Arambula with 
23 
24 
not only possession, but being a persistent violator. 
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the second enhancement was 
withdrawn, and he pied guilty to the possession charge. 
He did that in front of the Honorable Daniel 
25 Meehl, who conducted a hearing not only as to taking that 
20 
1 plea. By pleading guilty, he waived the right to 
2 challenge that, or make that challenge. 
3 Second, I find that even if he had, and even if 
4 his counsel had somehow been ineffective in failing to 
5 raise that issue for him, that he would not prevail on 
6 that issue. The cases cited In the state's briefing in 
7 this case make it clear, and the statute makes it clear, 
I 8 
l 9 
that any amount of methamphetamine is sufficient to 
constitute a criminal act in the state of Idaho. And so 
I 10 even if those issues had been presented either to the 
1~f'l . triaicot.irt or at an appellate courtTffh-e case gone 
i 
12 that far, I do not find that those would have been 
13 successful arguments. 
14 Therefore, I find there is no merit to that 
15 particular allegation. 
16 He next argues that the district court refused 
17 to provide him with alternate counsel. The standard, as I 
18 understand, is this: Once a defendant expresses a 
19 dissatisfaction with counsel, the court is required to 
20 conduct a hearing to ferret out the nature of that 
21 complaint There is no particular structure as to how 
22 that hearing is to be conducted. 
23 In this case, as I said earlier with regard to 
24 my factual findings, Judge Meehl did in fact have a 
25 hearing on that issue where Mr. Arambula addressed that 
22 
1 plea, but also had a hearing as to whether or not 
2 Mr. Arambula was dissatisfied with his counsel. 
3 I think the record again is undisputed that 
4 Mr. Arambula expressed dissatisfaction with his previous 
5 counsel. The trial court granted Mr. Arambula additional 
6 time to visit with his counsel about that. And after a 
7 period of some three hours, I believe, Mr. Arambula 
8 indicated on the record that he was in fact satisfied with 
9 his prior counsel's representation. 
10 And I interpret the record to mean that he 
11 withdrew any claim of that he had been requesting -- or 
12 any claim that he did request change of counsel. 
13 The plea agreement in this case -~ Excuse me, 
14 not the plea agreement, but the guilty plea advisory form 
15 reflects that he acknowledged affirmatively that he was 
16 satisfied with the representation of his counsel. 
17 And ultimately was sentenced in accordance with 
18 the plea agreement, received the sentence recommended by 
19 the state. As part of that plea agreement, he also waived 
20 his right to appeal; and I think that is clear on the 
21 record, and undisputed in the record that he did that. 
22 Taking up his claims, specifically: First, he 
23 argues that the Idaho Code Section 37-2732 is 
24 unconstitutionally vague. That is an Issue that should 
25 have been raised at the trial level before entry of a 
21 
1 issue with the court. I find that that was a satisfactory 
2 hearing for purposes of his challenge to the replacement 
3 of his counsel, and that he in fact again withdrew or 
4 waived his claim against his prior counsel with regard to 
5 any conflict, and he - when he came back on the record 
6 and entered his plea. 
7 Judge Meehl discussed that specifically with 
8 him, and I find that there is no merit to this allegation. 
9 He raises several -- four issues with regard to 
10 ineffective assistance of counsel, the first of which is 
11 that he falled to file a motion to suppress the controlled 
12 substance. 
13 The issue in this case is not whether there was 
14 a negative test of the substance. If one reads the 
15 petition, it makes it sound as though there was a 
16 substance that was tested by the NIK method which turned 
17 out to be negative; and I don't interpret the preliminary 
18 hearing transcript or this record to reflect that 
19 I think what the record what I find the 
20 record shows is that the officer swabbed this scale, but 
21 what he swabbed wasn't part of the controlled substance. 
22 It was simply a swab on the scale; and he, for lack of a 
23 better way to put it, missed the substance that was on the 
24 scale; and that is far different than having a negative 
25 test. 
23 
1 To me, it was no more than a test that's 
2 ineffectual. That is demonstrated by the fact that at the 
3 police department Detective Rivers again swabbed the 
4 scale, obtained a substance under better lighting 
5 conditions which did test positive on the NIK test. Then, 
6 ultimately, the scale was also sent to the lab and tested 
7 oositive pursuant to a more formal testing procedure. 
B So even if there had been a motion to suppress 
9 filed, I would find that there would be no prejudice to 
10 the defendant in this case, because he has failed to make 
11 a showing that there was in fact not a substance on 
12 that on that scale. It is his burden in a 
13 post-conviction proceeding to offer this court some 
1lf evidence that had that scale been re-tested that it would 
15 have been tested to the benefit of the defendant. 
16 There is no showing in this record that he would 
'17 have that that would have occurred. 
· I 1a As the state has further argued, when the 
19 defendant entered a guilty plea in this case, by law he 
20 waived his right to file a suppression motion. 
21 And so for all of those reasons, I find that, 
22 number one, it wasn't ineffective assistance of counsel to 
23 begin with; and number two, even if there had been, there 
24 would have been no nothing served by having filed that 
I 25 motion. He would not have prevailed on the motion to 
24 
1 proceeding is required to make a showing that had those 
2 services been provided that there would have been a 
3 different result in this case. 
4 There is no showing in this record that any 
5 further testing of this digital scale would have resulted 
6 in any different test result than what we have in this 
,7 case, meaning positive for methamphetamine. 
8 He's failed, simply, to carry his burden in that 
9 regard. 
10 The next argument is that his counsel failed to 
·-11 -----~-the vaguely written chain of custody. I already 
12 commented on that point. I make a finding for this record 
13 that the chain of custody in this case is certainly . 
14 adequate and would have been adequate had this case ever 
15 gone to trial. 
16 Again, which it did not go to trial. By having 
17 pied guilty, he waived any defects with regard to that 
18 claim of chain of custody. He's made no showing that 
19 there is - in fact that the item tested by the state lab 
20 was not in fact the state -- or the item that was seized 
21 from his residence, and which he admitted ownership of. 
22 I'm not sure what defense counsel should have 
23 done in that regard. There was nothing to challenge, 
24 because Mr. Arambula entered a guilty plea in this case. 
25 The last category of claims is what the court 
26 
1 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
suppress at the district court level. 
The second argument he makes is that he failed 
to adequately cross examine Detective Rivers -- his 
counsel failed to adequately examine Detective Rivers at 
the preliminary hearing. 
Well, there are several problems with this. 
Number one, there was some cross examination by defense 
counsel of the detective at the preliminary hearing, and I 
think it was clarified as to what had occurred with regard 
to the testing of the substance. 
The technique of cross examination is a matter 
of strategy for counsel. I cannot make a finding that 
prior counsel's cross examination fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness with regard to cross 
examination. 
Third, again, it really is a moot point. 
Whether or not there was effective cross examination was 
mooted by the entry of a plea in this case. Essentially, 
any errors at the preliminary hearing are deemed mooted or 
waived by entry of a plea; and so I find that there is no 
merit to thls allegation, either. 
He next argues that his counsel failed to 
provide necessary services. Well, it goes back to the 
same point I just made with regard to the suppression 
motion. A petitioner in a post-conviction relief 
25 
perceives as issues raised by Mr. Arambula which was not 
addressed by the state's motion to dismiss. That's why I 
issued a notice of intent to dismiss under the statute 
dealing with the appeal issues. 
There has been no response to those 
allegations -- excuse me, not to the allegations, but to 
the state's ~- to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
For the reasons set forth in that notice of 
intent to dismiss, I find that any claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel relating to pursuing Mr. Arambula's 
,--~· ---~····-~·-·----..._~~·-~ 
appellate rights is not well-taken. And again, I'm not 
going to re-state everything I said in that notice. I'll 
simply incorporate that by reference. 
As we discussed at the outset of this hearing, 
assuming that Mr. Arambula files the affidavit that has 
been proposed in this case, I would not find that any of 
the contents of that affidavit would alter any of the 
conclusions that I have reached in this case. He really 
does not raise any new factual issues beyond that set 
forth in his original petition. 
For all of the reasons stated, I find there is 
no merit to his petition, and I will dismiss it with 
prejudice at this time. We will prepare an appropriate 
order to do that. 
Anything further in this record? 
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MR. WILLIAMS: There is, Your Honor. As I 
understand the court's wording, technically, you're 
dismissing his issue that there was no appeal filed 
because there was no response to it. 
Actually, there is a response to it. I just 
didn't want that to be an appellate point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me correct that. 
There is a response in the memorandum filed by 
Mr. Williams. It doesn't alter my analysis. 
But you are correct that there was a response, 
but that the response does not change my interpretation of 
this case or the law relating to it. 
So I will still dismiss this case, and we will 
prepare an order to do that. 
Thank you, Counsel, for your arguments this 
morning. 
MS. SWEESY: Thank you. 
MR WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(End of proceedings.) 
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DISTRICT COURT 
Fifth Judicial District 
County ofl\Nln Falla. Stste oflaaho 
FEB 28 2011 2-. u I I ; ;;,v A-,,,.,, 
~ c~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
Armando Keto Arambula, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 2010-5565 
) 
) 
) JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------) 
A hearing on the State's Motion for Summary Disposition of Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief was held on February 28, 2011. For the reasons given on the record 
during the hearing and for the reasons given in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Post Conviction Petition Claims filed by the Court on January 28, 2011, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Armando Keto Arambula's Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed on 
November 26, 2010 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Dated this ~ay of February 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .....:;..... __ -· of February 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Jill Sweesy 
Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, lD 83303 
Tim Williams 
Williams Law Office 
P.O. Box 282 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0282 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( &)'Court Folder 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
( .{Court Folder 
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APPENDIX C 
• - DISTRICT COURT Fifth Judicial District 
County or l'Hl11 F~llil • .J,urn of idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
Armando Keto Arambula, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 2010-5565 
) 
) 
) Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post 
) Conviction Petition Claims 
) 
) 
) 
---------------) 
Petitioner Armando Keto Arambula ("Arambula") filed a Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief ("PC R") on November 26, 2010. The State filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition of Petition for Post Conviction Relief on January 20, 2011. The State has 
moved for summary disposition on the following claims raised by Arambula: 
1. Idaho Code§ 37-2732 is unconstitutionally vague. 
2. The District Court erred in refusing to provide the petitioner with alternate 
counsel. 
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel based upon: 
a. Failing to file a motion to suppress the controlled substance test results. 
b. Failing to adequately cross examine Detective Ken Rivers at the 
preliminary hearing. 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post Conviction Petition Claims - 1 
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c. Failing to provide "the necessary services." 
d. Failing to address the "vaguely written chain of custody." 
The Court believes that Arambula also raises additional claims involving his right to 
appeal. These claims are the subject of the Court's notice of intent to dismiss. In 
addition, the Court takes judicial notice of the sentencing hearing in the underlying 
criminal case, CR-09-11246, and documents in the requested by the State. 1 
GOVERNING STANDARDS 
An action for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 
Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548 (1983). Like the plaintiff in any other civil proceeding, the 
applicant must substantiate, by a preponderance of evidence, the allegations upon 
which his request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; Russell v. 
State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). A district court may take judicial 
notice of the record in the underlying criminal case. Hayes v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 
739, 745 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct.App. 1987), affd 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
An action for post-conviction relief may be dismissed, either upon a motion for 
summary dismissal by a party or the court's own initiative. Idaho Code § 19-4906; See 
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). However, 
under either approach a petitioner must be given notice of the basis for the proposed 
dismissal. See Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho at 892, P .2d at 491. When a court is 
satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the 
applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any 
1 The Court has reviewed the electronic recording of the sentencing hearing because a reporter's 
transcript is not available. 
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further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application 
and its reasons for so doing. I.C. § 19-4906(b). The applicant shall be given 20 days to 
reply to the proposed dismissal. I.C. § 19-4906(b). Summary dismissal is appropriate 
only when the evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is 
framed, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 
763,819 P.2d 1159 (Ct. App. 1991); Hooverv. State, 114 Idaho 145,146,754 P.2d 458 
(Ct. App. 1988). 
"The Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act provides a mechanism whereby a 
person convicted of a crime may present evidence, not presented or heard at trial, 
which requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice". Parrott v. State, 117 
Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258 (1990). "As such, the Act provides an appropriate 
mechanism for considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel". Id. Article I, 
section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant "reasonably 
competent assistance of counsel." State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 95, 967 P .2d 702 
(1998). Likewise, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made 
applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
assures a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988). 
Our Supreme Court has adopted the two-prong Strickland test to evaluate 
whether a criminal defendant received effective assistance of counsel for post-
conviction relief purposes. State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323 (1999); 
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Wood, 132 Idaho 
alleged lack of 
A defendant seeking post-conviction relief based upon an 
counsel must prove that 1) counsel's performance was deficient 
and 2) that this deficiency was the source of actual prejudice. To prove prejudice, the 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceedings would likely have been different. Id. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Bare or conclusionary allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to 
entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 
898 (Ct. App. 2004). Allegations are insufficient for the grant of relief when they do not 
justify relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990). 
Allegations contained in the application for post conviction relief are also insufficient for 
the granting of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 Idaho (2007). 
ANALYSIS 
Arambula raises two claims that were not addressed within the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. Arambula states the following on pages C and D of his Affidavit 
of Facts in Support of Post Conviction Petition: 
On May 3rd, 201 O the Court sentenced Arambula to two (2) years fixed 
with five (5) years indeterminate for a unified term of seven (7) years. The 
Court in its Judgment and Commitment advised the defendant that he 
"loses the right to appeal except as to the sentence imposed." Exhibit "A" 
pg. 3 The Judgment and Commitment goes on to contradict itself stating 
"Arambula was advised of his right to appeal the judgment within 42 
days .... " Judgment and Commitment pg 6. In any event Arambula asserts 
his right to Appeal by way of the 6th and 14th Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and that to deprive him of this right is a violation of due 
process of law, 
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Moreover, Arambula instructed counsel Ben Andersen to file a direct 
appeal within the allotted 42 days and he failed to do so. 
Arambula first asserts that the deprivation of his right to appeal is 
unconstitutionaL The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of appeal 
right waivers in State v. Cope where it stated, "The right to appeal is purely a statutory 
right and is not a right guaranteed by any provision of the federal or state constitutions." 
142 Idaho 492, 496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006) citing State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456-
57, 872 P.2d 719-20 (1994). Arambula's assertion that he has the right to appeal "by 
way of the 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and that to 
deprive him of this right is a violation of due process of law" is incorrect. Accordingly, the 
Court gives notice of its intent to dismiss Arambula's claim that the deprivation of his 
right to appeal is unconstitutional. 
Arambula asserts his counsel's failure to file an appeal when instructed is a 
cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court agrees. See Hust v. 
State, 147 Idaho 682, 685, 214 P.3d 668, 671 (Idaho App., 2009). However, assuming 
arguendo that Arambula's counsel failed to file an appeal when requested and that 
failure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, Arambula has made no showing of 
actual prejudice required by the second prong of the Strickland test. 
As part of the plea agreement reached with the State, Arambula waived his 
appeal right. The Offer-Plea Agreement states: 
By accepting this officer the defendant waives the right to appeal any 
issues regarding the conviction, including matters involving the plea or the 
sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all suppression 
issues. However, the defendant retains the right to appeal the sentence if 
the Court exceeds the State's recommendation. 
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The sentence Arambula received did not exceed the State's recommendation. During 
the change of plea hearing Arambula answered, "Yes, sir" when asked if he fully 
understood the terms of the plea agreement and the guilty plea advisory. Change of 
Plea Hearing Transcript at 15. Further, when asked "could you promise me your 
decision to plead guilty in this case has been made completely voluntarily and of your 
own free will" Arambula replied, "Yes, sir." Id. at 14. Arambula knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to appeal and if an appeal had been filed it would have been dismissed. 
The Court finds no actual prejudice would have resulted even if Arambula's counsel 
failed to file an appeal when requested. 
Arambula asserts the statement, "Arambula was advised of his right to appeal 
the judgment within 42 days". within the Judgment of Conviction filed by the sentencing 
court on May 03, 2010 constitutes independent grounds to file an appeal. The Court 
disagrees. "Although a written judgment is presumably a correct statement of the 
judgment pronounced in open court, and for that reason is ordinarily treated as an 
expression of the judgment itself, the principle remains that the only legally cognizable 
sentence in a criminal case is the 'actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the 
defendant." State v. Wallace, 116 Idaho 930, 932, 782 P.2d 53, 55 (Idaho App., 1989) 
citing United States v. Bergmann, 836 F.2sd 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court 
takes judicial notice of the sentencing hearing held on May 03, 2010 where the 
sentencing judge specifically instructed Arambula that he had waived his appeal rights 
and did not advise him of any appeal rights. Because Arambula had waived his right to 
appeal, the Court gives notice of its intent to dismiss Arambula's claim of in effective 
assistance of counsel regarding failure of his counsel to file an appeal. 
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ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby gives Notice pursuant to LC. §19-4906 of its 
intention to dismiss Arambula's claims that deprivation of his right to appeal is 
unconstitutional and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal when 
requested with prejudice 20 days from the date of this Notice. In issuing this Notice the 
court is satisfied that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. 
Arambula may reply to this Notice as set forth in the statute. The remaining issues 
raised in the petition shall be addressed at the hearing on State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition of Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
Dated this ~ay of January 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the zg day of January 2011, I caused to be c,<""""0 ,... a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Jill Sweesy 
Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
Tlm Williams 
Williams Law Office 
P.O. Box 282 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0282 
Clerk 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) faxed ( "1 Court Folder 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed ( 0 Court Folder 
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